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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Wfr^oT^ 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
THOMAS OSSANA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
No. 20779 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Appeal from conviction and judgment in a felony case in the 
Third Judicial District Court before the Honorable Philip R. 
Fishier. 
JOHN D. O'CONNELL 
39 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
FILED 
IHN3 01987 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
THOMAS OSSANA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
No. 20779 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
COMES NOW the Defendant and Appellant and petitions the 
Court for a rehearing for the reason that the Court 
misapprehended the facts and overlooked the decision of the 
United State Supreme Court in United States v. Loud Hawk, 
U.S. , 106 Sup. Ct. 648 (1986) which was rendered after the 
oral argument of the instant case. 
In Loud Hawk. the Supreme Court set out the factors to be 
considered in evaluating delay attributable to an interlocutory 
appeal by the government: 
In assessing the purpose and reasonableness of 
such an appeal, courts may consider several 
factors. These include the strength of the 
Government's position on the appealed issue, the 
importance of the issue in the posture of the 
case, and — in some cases — the seriousness of 
the crime. United States v. Herman, 576 F.2d 
1139, 1146 (CA5 1978) (Wisdom, J.). For example, 
a delay resulting from an appeal would weigh 
heavily against the Government if the issue were 
clearly tangential or frivolous. Ibid. 
106 Sup. Ct. at 656. Thus, the Supreme Court has recently 
adopted the analysis suggested by appellant here in his opening 
brief, pp. 14-18. Delay caused by an interlocutory appeal will 
be counted against the government unless the government's 
position is strong and the appeal was reasonably necessary 
if the issue raised were tangential, it should be weighed heavily 
against the government. 
In this case, the County Attorney brought a collateral civil 
case rather than an interlocutory appeal. It is appellant's 
position that this aggravated the situation since it removed the 
cause from the criminal procedural system with its intrinsic 
checks against delay. Certainly, the standard for a collateral 
review should not be less stringent than for an interlocutory 
appeal. 
The decision of this Court did not address the merits or the 
necessity of the County Attorney seeking collateral relief and 
instead focused on whether the defendant's counsel took 
affirmative steps to push the collateral proceedings. It is 
submitted that under Loud Hawk the key question is whether the 
criminal action should have been interrupted at all. 
The prosecutor had clear alternatives to the drastic course 
pursued in this case. As this Court observed in its decision in 
the collateral case, the prosecutor could have chosen to return 
the money seized from the defendant and thereby removed the 
predicate for the discovery order. Cannon v. Keller, 692 P. 2d 
740, 742, n.3 (Utah 1984). The dilemma of the prosecutor was of 
his own making as he sought to maintain the inconsistent claims 
of the materiality of the money and the non-materiality of its 
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source. Ibid. 
It is important that the prosecution "made no factual 
showing respecting harm resulting from disclosure" either at the 
hearing on the discovery order, Ibid., 740 P.2d at 743, or at the 
hearing on the motion to dismiss the criminal case in the 
district court below. At the trial below, the "informant" 
testified that he was not contacted regarding whether he had a 
desire to remain anonymous following the date of the alleged 
purchase (T-166, R-416) and that he "didn't know why they didn't 
do it {reveal his identity] a long time ago," (T-168, R-418). It 
is apparent that the prosecutor made no effort to determine if 
there was any reason why he should not simply comply with the 
discovery order and reveal the informant's identity. 
The merit of the collateral action was addressed by this 
Court in its decision on that matter which characterized the 
county attorney's argument as "attenuated." Cannon v. Keller, 
supra at 742. That case was clearly neither "close" nor did it 
involve novel questions that needed to be settled. Regardless of 
the merits, the issue was entirely tangential to the question of 
guilt or innocence. 
In the instant case, the state made no effort to either 
justify the merits of the County Attorney's position in the 
collateral case or, more importantly, advance any reasonable 
purpose for initiating it. 
The concurring opinion did address the apparent bad faith of 
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the County Attorney but found it vitiated by the finding of the 
District Court in its rulings for the County Attorney in the 
collateral proceeding. It is respectfully suggested that this 
analysis is also faulty because the District Court in the 
collateral action did not ever consider the necessity for the 
action nor weigh that necessity against the defendant's and 
public's right to a speedy trial. The District Court initially 
found that Circuit Courts lack jurisdiction to issue discovery 
orders, then on rehearing reversed that ruling, on the urging of 
the Attorney General, and held that the discovery order was 
invalid because the findings of fact were not detailed enough. 
Even if it were assumed, contrary to this Court's unanimous 
holding, that the district court was correct, it is submitted 
that freezing a criminal prosecution for months to review the 
adequacy of findings on an evidentiary ruling constitutes delay 
to resolve a "tangential" matter under Loud Hawk, supra, which 
should be weighed heavily against the state. However, since the 
collateral proceeding was a civil case, the District Court in 
that matter was not concerned with whether the action ought to 
have been brought but instead focused on resolving the 
controversy between the County Attorney and the Circuit Court. 
The district court's resolution of that controversy did not in 
any way determine whether the County Attorney was acting with 
good judgment, not to mention good faith, in staying the criminal 
action and presenting the controversy. 
This Court's decision repeatedly stresses the importance of 
-4-
the misapprehended fact that the defendant himself stayed the 
preliminary hearing. The record does not show that the defendant 
ever stayed the preliminary hearing. The steps taken by the 
defendant on March 1, 1987, were explained and documented in 
detail in Appellant's Reply Brief pp. 3-5. Suffice it to say 
that Appellant, in order to protect his rights and those of the 
Circuit Court, stayed the effect of a spurious, if not bogus, 
purported order of the district court in the collateral 
proceeding for a period of seven days. 
Even if appellant's counsel had not taken this action, it 
is highly unlikely that the Attorney General would have failed to 
take similar action as that office also was seeking a rehearing 
of the ruling that Circuit Courts lack jurisdiction over 
discovery. 
From November 12, 1980, until January 31, 1985, "all actions 
pending in the Fifth Circuit Court" in the criminal case were 
stayed by the ex parte order obtained by the prosecutor. The 
Circuit Court was restrained from hearing any motions to dismiss 
or for "an expedited preliminary hearing." 
Both the Court's opinion and the concurring opinion seem to 
take the position that the delay became the appellant's 
responsibility when he continued to contest the collateral case. 
It is conceded that appellant could have chosen not to appeal the 
second ruling (the Circuit Court was contesting the first ruling 
whether the appellant did or did not) and thereby shortened the 
delay. However, where a collateral decision is not only clearly 
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erroneous but delivered in an action which was brought without 
any justification, it seems unreasonable to require a defendant 
to choose between foregoing his rightful discovery rights or his 
Constitutional right to a speedy trial. It cannot be said that 
because the defendant elected to appeal the collateral decision 
that he "wanted" to delay the trial. He was entitled to either 
his discovery or his money and his right to a speedy trial. 
It is submitted that this Court should rehear this matter in 
order to apply the Loud Hawk analysis which would weigh delay 
caused by the prosecutor's effort to collaterally review a 
tangential matter heavily against the state. 
Respectfully submitted on this 
3 0 ^ day of June, 1987. 
JpHN D. O'CONNELL 
Attorney for Appellant 
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